
Image by Gunnar Pippel, Shutterstock
A few years ago, I had to grapple with a dissenting trade arbitrator who refused to sign an award. That trade arbitrator was subsequently removed (endorsed by the Court).
We also come across dissenting arbitrators who feel compelled to write a dissenting “award”. Some lawyers think that this can, at least optically, enhance a party’s chances on appeal. My own experience is that this is overrated.
Two days ago, the Supreme Court published its judgment in the matter involving Mr Shvidler (and the super yacht Phi). The case centred on the imposition of sanctions. The appellants challenged the decisions imposing sanctions on them as disproportionately interfering with their private life and property rights. The appeals failed.
In a powerful dissenting judgment Lord Leggatt disagreed with the majority in relation to Mr Shvidlers’ appeal.
It has been said that dissenting judgments from our highest court can become relevant to the law of tomorrow – food for thought.
In his conclusion Lord Leggatt said:
“I do not consider that the reasons relied on by the government come close to justifying such a drastic curtailment of his liberty. The restrictions are unjust and disproportionate to any contribution which they would rationally be expected to make to the purposes of the Regulations. Although I am alone in doing so, I deprecate and would declare unlawful the removal of basic freedoms to which Mr Shvidler should be entitled as a citizen of this country. I would allow his appeal.”
Powerful words, on any view.
By Brian Perrott
Partner, HFW

